Superior Court of the State of California
County of Orange
TENTATIVE RULINGS FOR DEPARTMENT CM08
Temporary Judge Catherine Evans

Date: 11/04/2026

Court Room Rules and Notices:

#	Case Name	Tentative
1	**Sanchez – Trust; 2025-01534283**	**Demurrer/Motion to Strike** Respondent Stella Gonzales' Demurrer (ROA 17) is **OVERRULED**. Respondent Stella Gonzales' Motion to Strike (ROA 17) is **DENIED**. Petitioners Dolores Sanchez and Teresa Carey's Request for Judicial Notice (ROA 26) is **GRANTED.** **I. ALLEGATIONS OF THE PETITION** This proceeding arises out of the Sanchez Family Trust dated March 11, 1996 (1996 Trust) created by Leo Sanchez and Rebecca Sanchez (collectively, Trustors). Leo Sanchez died in April 2006. Rebecca died in April 2010. Trustors had two children, Stella Gonzales (Stella) and Gilbert Sanchez (Gilbert), who were beneficiaries of the 1996 Trust and were named as successor co-trustees. Although Stella and Gilbert were named as co-trustees, the Petition alleges Stella took advantage of Gilbert's physical vulnerabilities to deny Gilbert access to information about the 1996 Trust and took the assets of the 1996 Trust for herself. One of the assets of the 1996 Trust was a 2/3 interest in certain real property located at 132 Clearwater Way, Rancho, Mirage, California (RM Property Share). According to the terms of the 1996 Trust, Stella and

Gilbert were each entitled to 50% of the RM Property Interest. In April or May 2024, Gilbert first learned Stella claimed she was entitled to 100% of the RM Property Share, leaving Gilbert with nothing.

In addition to the RM Property Share, the 1996 Trust had cash assets of nearly $200,000. The Petition alleges Stella took the entire amount for her own use and/or distributed it into her own family trust.

Gilbert died in April 2025. The Petition is brought by his daughters, Dolores Sanchez and Teresa Carey, as Gilbert's successors in interest. The Petition seeks an order transferring Gilbert's 50% of the RM Property Share and his half of the cash assets either back into the 1996 Trust to be distributed to Petitioners or into Gilbert's separate family trust. The Petition also seeks an accounting from Stella as trustee of the 1996 Trust, alleges she breached her fiduciary duty, asserts a financial elder abuse claim, and seeks double and punitive damages as well as attorneys' fee.

II. DEMURRER

Stella demurs to the Petition on the following grounds: (1) it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (2) it is uncertain because it fails to "identify the legal basis by which Petitioners, as trustees of [Gilbert's family trust], are entitled to seek judicial supervision of the [1996 Trust], a separate and distinct trust ; and (3) it fails to state facts sufficient to support the claims for double damages, punitive damages, or attorney's fees.

A. Statute of Limitations

Petitioners argue the claims in the Petition are time-barred because in 2011, Stella recorded a quitclaim deed relating to the RM

		Property Share. They argue the 2011 deed put Gilbert on notice so that latest statute of limitations expired in 2015. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the Petition alleges delayed discovery. It specifically asserts Gilbert did not know Stella was claiming the entire RM Property Share and denying him his half until April or May 2024. On demurrer, all properly pleaded material facts must be accepted as true. (*Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist.* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.) A claim traditionally accrues "'when "[it] is complete with all of its elements"—those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation.'" (*Aryeh v. Cannon Business Solutions, Inc.* (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191.) The delayed discovery rule, however, "postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action." (*Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.) "Under the [delayed] discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her." (*Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110.) To sufficiently allege delayed discovery, a plaintiff "'must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery *and* (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.' [Citation.] Citing Civil Code section 1213, Stella argues Petitioners cannot allege delayed discovery because the quitclaim deed was recorded. As set forth above, the recorded quitclaim deed does not disclose Stella's claim to the entire RM Property Share. Further, even if it had, section 1213 only imposes constructive knowledge as a result of a recorded deed on "subsequent purchasers and mortgagees." Petitioners are neither.

		Stella also argues the knowledge Gilbert gained in April/May 2024 came from statements made during settlement negotiation and is, therefore, barred by Evidence Code section 1152(a) from being used to allege delayed discovery. First, the Petition says nothing about any settlement discussions. Accordingly, as that assertion is outside of the Petition, it cannot be considered on demurrer. Further, section 1152(a) does not generically prohibit the introduction of evidence of settlement discussions. It reads, in full: "Evidence that a person has, in compromise or from humanitarian motives, furnished or offered or promised to furnish money or any other thing, act, or service to another who has sustained or will sustain or claims that he or she has sustained or will sustain loss or damage, as well as any conduct or statements made in negotiation thereof, is inadmissible to prove his or her liability for the loss or damage or any part of it." In short, evidence of money offered in settlement cannot be used to prove liability. The Petition alleges: "around April 2024 and May 2024 . . . [Stella] left multiple voicemail messages for [Gilbert] indicating her belief that the entire [RM Property Share] . . . was gifted solely to [her.]" Such messages are not an offer of settlement. Neither are they being offered to prove liability. Second, even if the Petition did not sufficiently allege delayed discovery, the quitclaim deed (attached as Exhibit 3 to the Petition) does not reflect that Stella is claiming the entire 2/3 RM Property Share. The deed states: "I, Stella Gonzales, having previously conveyed a 2/3 interest in [the RM Property] . . . Hereby, both individually and as Successor Trustee of the [1996 Trust], REMISE, RELEASE AND FOREVER QUITCLAIM ***my entire interest*** in said real property **. . ."** (Bolding and italics added.) The quitclaim deed conveys Stella's interest, not the full 2/3 interest.

		"'A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.'" (*Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc.* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 342.) The allegations of the Petition are sufficient to allege delayed discovery, and the demurrer is **OVERRULED** on time-bar grounds. **B. Uncertainty/Standing** Stella argues the Petition fails because Petitioners fail to "identify the legal basis by which Petitioners, as trustees of [Gilbert's family trust], are entitled to seek judicial supervision of the [1996 Trust], a separate and distinct trust." Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 377.30, "[a] cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedent's successor in interest . . . and an action may be commenced by the decedent's personal representative or, if none, by the decedent's successor in interest." A successor in interest is specifically authorized to pursue a financial elder abuse claim. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.3(d)(1)(B). Petitioners allege they stand in Gilbert's shoes and the allegations are sufficient. Stella argues Petitioners cannot proceed as Gilbert's successors in interest because they failed to comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32. However, Petitioners filed the required documents with the court one day before the demurrer was filed. They belated compliance

		with the statutory requirements is sufficient. (*Aghaian v. Minassian* (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 603, 614 ["Here, Plaintiffs asserted causes of action as their parents' successors in interest, yet they filed their section 377.32 declarations well after commencing the action. . . . That Plaintiffs failed to immediately file their section 377.32 declarations, therefore, does not render the original complaint and FAC nullities."].) The Petition alleges Petitioners are Gilbert's successors-in-interest. The allegation is sufficient and the demurrer is **OVERRULED** on this ground. **C. Failure to State Facts** Stella argues the Petition fails to allege sufficient facts to support the requests for double damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. "'To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff's proof need not be alleged. [Citation.]'" (*Ferrick v. Santa Clara University* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1341.) A complaint "is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts." (*Doe v. City of Los Angeles* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) "Ultimate facts are those 'on which liability depends,' as distinguished from both the evidence proving those facts [citation] and conclusions of law." (*Estes v. Eaton Corp.* (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 643, fn. 2.) In other words, California operates under notice pleading standards. (*Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA* (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 304, fn. 14.) This is, in part, because ambiguities in a pleading "can be clarified

under modern discovery procedures." (*Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc.* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A cause of action is sufficiently stated if it asserts the required elements of the claim.

The Petition alleges Stella took advantage of Gilbert's physical infirmities to deny him any role as co-trustee of the 1996 Trust, including access to information about or assets of the trust. The Petition alleges Stella took both the entire RM Property Share and the cash assets of the 1996 Trust without giving Gilbert any of his share. Accepting those allegations as true, as the court must do on a demurrer, they are sufficient to support claims for statutory double damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees.

The allegations are sufficient and the demurrer is **OVERRULED** on this ground.

III. MOTION TO STRIKE

The demurrer also includes a separate motion to strike. The motion seeks to strike "[a]ll allegations seeking double damages," [a]ll allegations seeking punitive damages," and "[a]ll allegations seeking attorney's fees." (Demurrer at 4:8-13.) The motion to strike fails to comply with Rule 3.1322(a), which mandates: "[a] notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading ***must*** quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count, or defense. Specifications in a notice must be numbered consecutively." (Emphasis added.)

Even if the motion to strike had fulfilled the requirements of Rule 3.1322, it would be denied. As set forth above, the allegations are sufficient—at the pleading stage—to support the claimed damages.

Petitioners are directed to give notice.

2	**Horwich – Trust; 30-2022-01045532**	
3	**Katz – Trust; 30-2022-01251727**	**Motion off calendar pursuant to notice filed 10/19/2026.**
4	**Garlick – Conservatorship; 30-2022-01292249**	
5	**Oltmans – Trust; 30-2025-01474661**	**Motion to Enforce Settlement** Before the court is Petitioner Sanford Bosworth's Motion for Enforcement of the Settlement Agreement Pursuant to CCP § 664.6 (ROA 128). The motion arises out of a May 20, 2026 settlement agreement (Settlement) between Donald and Joseph Oltmans (Trustees), as trustees of the Oltmans Living Trust dated January 19, 2006, and Petitioner. The day after filing this motion, Petitioner filed a seemingly identical motion (ROA 132), set for hearing on December 9, 2026. Trustees filed an opposition to the motion set for hearing today. Petitioner, however, did not file any reply. Petitioner should be prepared to address whether he intended to proceed with the motion today or on December 9, 2026. The Settlement is also the subject of a petition for approval, filed before either of the motions to enforce. That petition is set for hearing on November 24, 2026 at 9:00 a.m. in Department CM03. Petitioner should be prepared to address whether the Settlement must be approved before it can be enforced.

6	**Wirick – Probate; 30-2016-00840141**	**Motion to Compel (2)** Petitioner Ryan Wirick's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (ROA 165) is **GRANTED.** The accompanying request for sanctions is **GRANTED** in the amount of $1,560 (3 hours $500 per hour plus $60 filing fee). Petitioner Ryan Wirick's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Demand for Production of Documents and the Documents (ROA 180) is **GRANTED**. The accompanying request for sanctions is **GRANTED** in the amount of $2,560 (5 hours at $500 per hour plus $60 filing fee). Form Interrogatories. Petitioner moves to compel supplemental responses to Form Interrogatories #2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, & 2.7, which seek basic background information. Respondent replied with privacy and relevance objections and no information. The scope of discovery is very broad. (*See State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. C. v. Lee* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 34, 40.) "Any doubts regarding relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery." (*Mercury Interactive Cop. v. Klein* (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98.) As the California Supreme Court explained in *Williams v. Superior Court* (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541: "Section 2017.010 and other statutes governing discovery 'must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.' [Citation.] This means that 'disclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it.'" California's constitutional right of privacy is one of those public policy considerations that might impact the right to disclosure. However, whether documents protected by a right of privacy should be produced is

		evaluated under the balancing test set forth in *Williams v. Superior Court* (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531: "[t]he party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests [the] disclosure serves, while a party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measure that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations." (*Williams, supra,* at p. 552.) Under the foregoing principles and having undertaken the required balancing, the court overrules the objections and grants the motion. The objections are overruled and Respondent is **ORDERED** to provide supplemental written responses to Form Interrogatories #2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, & 2.7, without objection. The supplemental responses must be provided within 21 days of this order. <u>Document Production Requests</u>. Petitioner moves to compel supplemental responses to Requests for Production #10, 14, & 16, each of which seeks documents relating to receipts of money from certain estate properties sold by Respondent. Respondent's reply to Request #10 was "None ever" and his response to Requests 14 & 16 was "None ever in Administrator's possession." A party who cannot produce documents in response to a request must "affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand," "specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stole, or has never been, or is not longer, in the

		possession, custody or control of the responding party," and "set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item." (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) Respondent's replies to Requests # 10, 14, & 16 fail to satisfy the statutory requirements. Further, Respondent acknowledges in his opposition that, contrary to the representations in his original responses, he obtained and produced documents in response to the requests. Respondent is **ORDERED** to provide supplemental written responses to Requests # 10, 14, & 16 that fully comply with the requirements of section 2031.210 et seq and to produce all responsive documents within his possession, custody, or control. The supplemental responses and documents must be provided within 21 days of this order. The accompanying requests for sanctions are **GRANTED** in the amount of $2,620 (5 hours at $500 per hour plus filing fees of $120). Petitioner to give notice.
7	**Coggeshall - Conservatorship; 30-2026-01555602**	**Matter continued to 12/16/2026 per minute order dated 11/03/2026.**
8	**Gillespie – Probate; 30-2025-01517519**	**Motion to Compel** At the request of the moving party, Petitioner Stacey Haft's Motion to Over-Rule Objections and Obtain Compliance with Subpoena (ROA 59) is **CONTINUED** to January 13, 2027 at 9:00 a.m. in Department CM08. Moving party is directed to give notice.

9	**Hebert – Trust; 30-2025-01534429**	
10	**Zimmerman – Trust; 30-2026-01541414**	**Demurrer** The Demurrer of Petitioner Richard Cavaliero to Pearla Zimmerman's Objection to Petition etc. (ROA 15) is **OVERRULED**. This proceeding arises out of the Richard Zimmerman Living Trust (Trust). The trustor Richard Zimmerman (Decedent) died on September 13, 2024. He was predeceased by his wife Tanya Zimmerman, who died on June 31, 2021. Decedent did not have any surviving children, parents, or siblings. Petitioner Richard Cavaliero is Tanya's nephew. He asserts that four days before his death, Decedent created a power of attorney that named Petitioner as his attorney in fact. On the day of Decedent's passing, Petitioner, as Decedent's attorney in fact, executed the newly created Trust and an associated will. Petitioner initiated this proceeding with a petition seeking to transfer certain of Decedent's bank accounts into the Trust. Objector Pearla Zimmerman, Tanya's adopted daughter, filed objections to the Petition (Objections), asserting the Trust and associated will are invalid on various grounds. Petitioner demurred to the Objections on the following grounds: (1) Objector does not have standing as an interested person; and (2) the Objections are time-barred because they were filed more than 120 days after service of notice under Probate Code section 16061.7.

		Standing. The Objections assert Objector is Decedent's predeceased spouse's daughter. Accordingly, under California law, she is Decedent's heir. (Prob. Code, § 6402.5(a)(1) ["For purposes of distributing real property . . . if the decedent had a predeceased spouse who died not more than 15 years before the decedent and there is no surviving spouse or issue of the decedent, the portion of the decedent's estate attributable to the decedent's predeceased spouse passes . . . to the surviving issue of the predeceased spouse"].) An heir is an interested person under Probate Code section 48. As an heir, Objector has standing and the demurrer is **OVERRULED** on that ground. Time-bar. Petitioner argues the objection is time-barred because it was filed more than 120 days after he served notice under Probate Code section 16061.7. The Objections, however, specifically assert Objector never received notice. (ROA 8 at 2:15-20.) "'[I]t is well settled that a general demurrer admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the [pleading] . . .'" (*John's Grill, Inc. v. The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.* (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1003, 1013.) Further, "[a] demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. In order for the bar ... to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred."] (*Coalition for an Equitable Westlake/MacArthur Park v. City of Los Angeles* (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 368, 376, internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Objector's assertion that she did not received notice is sufficient to withstand the demurrer, which is **OVERRULED** on this ground. Objector is directed to give notice.

11	**Shah – Probate; 30-2024-01376793**	
12	**Taplin – D A220587**	**Motion for Order** Before the court this day is Garrett E. Taplin's Motion for Order Directing Opposing Counsel to Establish an Alternative Method of Receiving Service (ROA 347). By the motion, moving party seeks an order directing opposing counsel Jazmyne D. Alverson "to establish an alternative method to receive the Court documents filed for the remainder of this case." On October 6, 2026, a substitution of attorney was filed in this proceeding, notifying the court and all parties that Jazmyne D. Alverson will no longer be representing Cynthia Taplin and that Cynthia Taplin will now be representing herself. Accordingly, the relief sought by the motion is moot and the motion is **DENIED** as moot. The court will give notice.
13	**Donaldson – Probate; 30-2023-01323260**	**Motion for Sanctions** Petitioner Darla Merritt's unopposed Amended Motion for Sanctions Against Eric Donaldson (ROA 355 is **GRANTED** in part and **CONTINUED** in part as set forth below. By the motion, Petitioner seeks monetary, issue, evidentiary, and terminating sanctions. Relevant procedural history. On June 3, 2026, the court ordered Eric Donaldson (Donaldson) to: (1) "provide written responses, without objection, to Inspection Demands 1-15 and to produce all documents

		responsive to each of the requests" and (2) "provide further responses, without objection, to Form Interrogatory 17.1 (for responses to Requests for Admission Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 ,6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 & Exhibit 1) and Form Interrogatory 50.1 and 50.6. (ROA 240.) The responses were due by 5:00 p.m. on June 22, 2026 and monetary sanctions were awarded in the total amount of $3,690. (*Ibid.*) Donaldson did not provide responses or documents by the mandated deadline. Counsel for Petitioner attempted to meet and confer but received no response. On August 12, 2026, the court ordered Donaldson to "provide verified written responses, without objection, to Inspection Demands 17-42 and to produce all documents responsive to each of the requests within 20 days of the order" and awarded monetary sanctions of $1,547.50. (ROA 299.) Donaldson did not comply with the order. On September 15, 2026, the court ordered Donaldson to "provide verified written responses, without objection, to [Inspection Demand, Set Four] and to produce all documents responsive to each of the requests within 30 days of [the] order" and awarded monetary sanctions of $1,547.50. (ROA 338.) Donaldson was also ordered to appear for deposition no later than October 14, 2026 and produce all documents responsive to the request for documents served with the deposition notice no later than October 7, 2026 (*Ibid.*) Petitioner was awarded monetary sanctions of $5,470 in connection with the deposition. (*Id*.) The moving papers were filed before the 30-day period expired, so the court does not know if Donaldson complied fully with that order, but he did not produce the documents by October 7 as ordered.

		Sanctions. "The sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023 are potent. They include monetary sanctions, contempt sanctions, issue sanctions ordering that designated facts be taken as established or precluding the offending party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, evidence sanctions prohibiting the offending party from introducing designated matters into evidence, and terminating sanctions that include striking part or all of the pleadings, dismissing part or all of the action, or granting a default judgment against the offending party." (*new Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1430.) "'The discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination. "Discovery sanctions 'should be appropriate to the dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery.'" [Citation.] If a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse. "A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction."'" (*Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar* (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 690, 701–702.) Donaldson did not file any opposition to the motion and has not made any attempt to explain his conduct. He has demonstrated a

		pattern of misuse of the discovery process as well as disobedience of this court's orders. The court gives Donaldson one last opportunity to provide the required discovery responses as follows. 1. Donaldson is **ORDERED** to provide written responses, without objection, to Inspection Demands 1-15 and to produce all documents responsive to each of the requests no later than 5:00 p.m. on November 13, 2026. 2. Donaldson is **ORDERED** to provide further responses, without objection, to Form Interrogatories 17.1 (for responses to Requests for Admission Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 ,6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 & Exhibit 1), 50.1 and 50.6 no later than 5:00 p.m. on November 13, 2026. 3. Donaldson is **ORDERED** to provide verified written responses, without objection, to Inspection Demands 17-42 and to produce all documents responsive to each of the requests no later than 5:00 p.m. on November 13, 2026. 4. Donaldson is **ORDERED** to provide verified written responses, without objection, to each demand included in Inspection Demand, Set Four and to produce all documents responsive to each of the requests no later than 5:00 p.m. on November 13, 2026. 5. If he has not already appeared for deposition, Donaldson is **ORDERED** to produce all documents responsive to the request for documents served with the

		deposition notice no later than 5:00 p.m. on November 10, 2026 and appear for deposition no later than November 13, 2026. If Donaldson does not fully comply with the foregoing orders, the court is likely to impose issue, evidentiary, and/or terminating sanctions. The motion before the court this day is **GRANTED** as to its request for monetary sanctions in the amount of $8,985. Donaldson is **ORDERED** to pay those sanctions within 20 days of this order. Further, to the extent the previously ordered monetary sanctions ($3,690 awarded on 06/03/26; $1,547.50 awarded on 08/12/26; and $7,017.50 awarded on 09/15/26) have not already been paid, Donaldson is **ORDERED** to pay them within 20 days of this order. The court reserves its determination on the requests for issue, evidentiary, and terminating sanctions. The hearing on the motion is **CONTINUED** to December 16, 2026 at 9:00 a.m. in Department CM08 for hearing on those reserved issues. Petitioner is directed to file a supplemental declaration regarding Donaldson's compliance/noncompliance with this order including the payment of monetary sanctions. The supplemental declaration is to be filed and served no later than November 30, 2026. Donaldson may file and serve a responsive declaration no later than December 7, 2026. Petitioner is directed to give notice.

14	**Benford – Conservatorship; 30-2024-01394079**	**Motion for Sanctions** On October 21, 2026, this court ordered Naomi Fisher to pay $6,455 in monetary sanctions to James within 30 days and to electronically serve full and complete responses, without objection, to James' form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and requests for production of documents no later than 5:00 p.m. October 28, 2026. She was ordered to file full copies of those responses with the court no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 28, 2026. On October 26, 2026, Fisher filed a substitution of attorney, substituting Zachary Sanderson of Danton Law PA as counsel. (ROA 414) A notice of association was also filed asking that all notices, etc. be served on Mr. Sanderson. (ROA 411) Nothing else has been filed by Fisher, specifically the responses were not filed as ordered. Naomi Fisher should be prepared to address her failure to file the responses as ordered.